Integration, Social Distress, and Policy Formation by Stark, Oded
 






Integration, Social Distress, and Policy Formation 
by
Oded Stark
lt  f i   i l i
. i i. i-t i .
i it  f i
i   i
i  i
. 
I t ti , i l i t ,  li  ti  
t








Universities of Bonn, Klagenfurt, Tuebingen, and Vienna; 
















Mailing Address: Oded Stark                                                                        January 2012  
 ZEF, University of Bonn 
 Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 
 D-53113 Bonn 
 Germany 
 





This paper is a revised and condensed version of the text of keynote addresses that the 
author delivered at the European Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Athens, April 
2009, and at the International Workshop on Regional Competitiveness and International 




I study the integration of regions in the form of a merger of populations, which I interpret 
as a revision of people’s social space and their comparison set; I illustrate the way in 
which a merger can aggravate social distress; and I consider policy responses. 
Specifically, I view the merger of populations as a merger of income vectors; I measure 
social distress by aggregate relative deprivation; I demonstrate that a merger increases 
aggregate relative deprivation; and I show that a social planner is able to reverse this 
increase by means of least-cost, post-merger increases in individual incomes, but is 
unable to counter it by relying exclusively on a self-contained income redistribution that 
retains individual levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger levels.     
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1. A brief introduction 
In this paper, I review the integration of economies as a merger of populations. When 
economies merge, a variety of benefits are anticipated: denser markets, increased 
efficiency and productivity brought about by scale effects, and the like. Classical trade 
theory has it that integration liberalizes trade and smoothes labor and financial flows. 
Denser and larger markets improve resource allocation and the distribution of final 
products. As a result, the welfare of the integrating populations is bound to rise. The 
picture may not be so bright, however. The merger of groups of people revises their 
social space and their comparison set. Belonging to a larger society can increase the 
aggregate level of distress. If so, then, the process of integration may not only enhance 
welfare but also chip away at the sense of wellbeing.  
Using a robust example, I derive four results:  
1. I show that the social distress of a merged population is higher than the sum of the 
levels of social distress of the constituent populations when apart. 
2. I calculate the minimal cost that a social planner has to incur who seeks to reverse the 
adverse repercussion of the merger on aggregate social distress.  
3. I calculate the minimal cost that a social planner has to incur who seeks to see to it that 
no individual ends up being subjected to post-merger distress that is greater than his pre-
merger distress. 
4. I show that it is impossible to escape the need to appeal to the social planner for funds 
to help address the post-merger reduction in the individuals’ wellbeing even when there 
are gainers from the merger who could in principle be taxed to facilitate income transfers 
to losers; apparently there is not enough of a gain to placate the losers. 
In the short concluding section, I remark on how general these four results are.  
 
2. Measuring regional distress 
I measure the distress of a population by the sum of the levels of distress experienced by 
the individuals who constitute the population. I refer to this sum as the aggregate relative 
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deprivation (ARD) of the population. I measure the distress of an individual by the extra 
income units earned by others in the population, I sum up these excesses, and I normalize 
by the size of the population. This procedure tracks the seminal work of Runciman 
(1966) and its articulation by Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980); a detailed 
description of the measure and of its derivation is in Stark and Hyll (2011). In my 
definition of relative deprivation, I resort to income-based comparisons, namely, an 
individual feels relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than 
he does. I assume that the comparison group of an individual consists of all members of 
his population.  
For an ordered vector of incomes in population P of size n , ( )1,..., nx x x= , where 
1 2 ... nxx x≤ ≤ ≤ , I define the relative deprivation of the i-th individual whose income is 
i
x , 1,2,...,i n= , as 




RD x x x x
n =
≡ −∑ .                                          (1) 
To ease the analysis that follows, an alternative representation of the relative deprivation 
measure is helpful. 
Let ( )iF x  be the fraction of those in population P whose incomes are smaller than 
or equal to 
i
x . The relative deprivation of an individual earning 
i
x  in population P with 
an income vector ( )1,..., nx x x=  is equal to the fraction of those whose incomes are 
higher than 
i
x  times their mean excess income; namely,  
                           ( ) [ ] ( ), 1 ( ) |i i i iRD x x F x E x x x x= − ⋅ − > .                                       (2) 
To obtain Eq. (2) from Eq. (1), I multiply 
1
n
 in (1) by the number of the individuals who 
earn more than 
i








−∑  in (1) by this same number. I then obtain two 
ratios: the first is the fraction of the population that earns more than the individual, 
namely, [ ]1 ( )iF x− ; the second is mean excess income, namely, ( )|i iE x x x x− > .  
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The aggregate relative deprivation is, in turn, the sum of the individual levels of 
relative deprivation 























∑ .                                   (3) 
( )ARD x  is my index of the level of “distress” of population P. (For several usages of this 
measure in recent related work see Stark, 2010; Stark and Fan, 2011; Stark and Hyll, 
2011; Fan and Stark, 2011; Stark et al., forthcoming; and Stark et al., 2012.)   
In sections 3-5, the individuals’ incomes are not allowed to decline. I impose this 
constraint because I do not know the marginal rate of substitution between a fall in 
relative deprivation and a fall in income, and consequently and for example, I do not 
know how much income I could take away from an individual whose relative deprivation 
falls in the wake of the merger, and transfer that income to other individual(s) whose 
relative deprivation increases in the wake of the merger. Therefore, to guarantee that the 
wellbeing of an individual will not be reduced in the process, I impose the requirement 
that incomes cannot be reduced. In section 6, I use a wellbeing function that enables me 
to trade off lower income for lower relative deprivation.  
 
3. Pre-merger and post-merger distress 
I consider the merger of populations 
1P  and 2P  with income vectors (1,2)  and (3,4), 
respectively. Recalling from Eq. (1) that the distress of an individual is measured by the 
extra income units earned by others in his population (here, in population 
1P , it is 2-1), 
the summing up of these excesses (here, this is 1), and normalizing by dividing by the 
size of the population (here, this is 2), the pre-merger aggregate relative deprivation of 
population 
1P  is ( )1,2 1 / 2ARD = . The pre-merger level of the aggregate relative 
deprivation of population 
2P  is ( )3,4 1 / 2ARD = . In the merged population with income 
vector ,(1,2 3,4) , the aggregate relative deprivation is ( )1,2,3,4 5 / 2 1ARD = >  
( ) ( )1, 2 3,4 .ARD ARD= +  
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The result, that a merger entails an increase in aggregate relative deprivation, is 
neither trivial nor is it to be intuitively anticipated, the reason being that upon integration, 
the members of the poorer population (“1” and “2”) are subjected to more relative 
deprivation, whereas a member of the richer population (“3”) is subjected to less relative 
deprivation. Since one constituent population experiences an increase of its ARD while 
the other experiences a decrease, whether the ARD of the merged population is higher 
than the sum of the ARDs of the constituent populations cannot be predetermined. Put 
differently, in a setting in which others could only bring negative externalities, a smaller 
population will always experience less aggregate relative deprivation. But in a setting 
such as ours when others joining in can confer both negative externalities (of “3” and “4” 
upon “1” and “2”) and positive externalities (of “1” and “2” upon “3”), it is impossible 
intuitively to foresee whether the expansion of a population will entail a reduction in 
aggregate relative deprivation or an increase.
1
   
To reiterate: in the example, incomes are held constant; the incomes of members 
of a constituent population are not affected by its merger with another population. I 
assume that a merger changes the social comparisons space that governs the sensing and 
calculation of relative income (relative deprivation), but that it leaves absolute incomes 
intact.  
I next ask how a social planner who is concerned about the increase of the 
aggregate level of social distress will be able to respond in a cost-effective manner. Since 
the task is to maintain the aggregate, not the individual pre-merger level of distress, 




                                                 
1
 To see the variation in the externality repercussion even more starkly, note that when “3” joins “1” and 
“1,” he confers a negative externality on the incumbents; when “3” joins “5” and “5” he confers neither a 
negative externality nor a positive externality on the incumbents; and when “3” joins “4” and “5,” he 
confers a positive externality on incumbent “4.” 
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4. Bringing down cost-effectively the aggregate level of relative deprivation to a level 
equal to the sum of the pre-merger levels of aggregate relative deprivation in the 
two populations when apart 
Ordering the individuals by their incomes, I start “pumping” incomes from the bottom, 
and simultaneously gauge the aggregate relative deprivation response. The two processes 
move in tandem, and in opposite directions. The pumping from below is ratcheted up the 
hierarchy of the individuals, the set of the individuals to be “treated” is expanded a step at 
a time if the aggregate relative deprivation is still higher than it was prior to the merger, 
and the pumping ceases when the aggregate relative deprivation reaches its pre-merger 
level . Thus, I start by giving the individual earning 1 an additional unit of income; this is 
insufficient to bring down aggregate relative deprivation to its pre-merger level. I 
therefore add the next individual (the individual whose pre-merger income was 2) and 
proceed to increase the incomes of each of these two individuals whose incomes, for 
now, are 2 each. At the point where these two incomes are elevated to 11/ 4  each, I 
obtain income distribution (11 / 4,11 / 4,3,4)  with (11 / 4,11 / 4 3 4), ., 1ARD =  Thus, in 
order to bring the aggregate relative deprivation in the merged population to the sum of 
the pre-merger levels, a social planner has to transfer 7 / 4  units of income to the 
individual earning 1, and 3 / 4  units of income to the individual earning 2, which gives 
10 / 4  as the total cost of implementing the policy. This cost can be conceived as a lower 
bound on the productivity and efficiency gains that the merger of the two regions has to 
yield to retain a measure of the population’s wellbeing at its pre-merger level. 
 
5. Ensuring, cost-effectively, that no individual in the merged population senses 
higher relative deprivation than the relative deprivation that he had sensed prior to 
the merger 
Here I ask how a social planner who is concerned that the individuals’ pre-merger level 
of distress should not increase will respond in a cost-effective manner. 
I order the individuals by their pre-merger levels of relative deprivation, starting 
from the right; if individuals have the same pre-merger level of relative deprivation, I 
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place leftmost the one with the lower income. I first raise the incomes at the top of the 
constructed hierarchy of the levels of relative deprivation. I do so in order to equate the 
levels of relative deprivations of the top-income individuals with their pre-merger levels 
of relative deprivation. Then, because the comparisons that yield relative deprivation are 
with incomes on the right in the income hierarchy, the changes made at the top determine 
how much incomes farther down the hierarchy have to be raised as I move leftwards. 
Thus, in the merged population with income vector ,(1,2 3,4) , the ordering according to 
the descending pre-merger levels of relative deprivation (with the lower of the two 
incomes associated with the same level of relative deprivation placed leftmost) is 
(1,3,2,4) . I pick first “for treatment” the individual with income 4. Noting that his 
relative deprivation was not increased as a result of the merger, I leave his income as 
before and thus, (1,3,2,4)  is the resulting income distribution. Moving leftwards, I next 
attend to the individual with income 2. Since his RD now is 3/4 whereas prior to the 
merger it was 0, I need to raise his income to 4. Consequently, I obtain income 
distribution (1,3,4,4) . Proceeding further leftwards to “3,” I see that now, as prior to the 
merger, the RD of “3” is 1/2, so no increase in income is needed in this case. Thus, I 
obtain the income distribution (1,3,4,4) . Because the remaining individual with income 1 
has now RD of 2 whereas prior to the merger he had RD of 1/2, I need to increase his 
income to 3 because then his RD will be 1/2. Thus, the final income vector is (3,3,4,4) , 
which gives 4 as the total cost of implementing the policy.  
Not surprisingly, since the constraint on implementing this policy is stricter than 
the constraint on implementing the preceding policy, enacting the latter policy is costlier 
( 4 2.5> ). As in the preceding case, this cost can be interpreted as a lower bound on the 
productivity and efficiency gains that the merger has to yield in order to retain a measure 






6. The financial unfeasibility of a self-contained, non-publicly-financed policy aimed 
at retaining individuals’ levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger levels 
I now relax the assumption that individuals’ incomes cannot be reduced. I assume that the 
wellbeing of individual i, 1,2,...,i n=  is a function of his absolute income and of his 
relative deprivation, such that the preferences of an individual in population P with an 
ordered income vector x are  
                                 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 ,i i i iu u x x x RD x xα α= = − −                                  (4) 
where 0 1α< < . 
As already noted, when a population with income vector (1,2) joins a population 
with income vector (3,4), the relative deprivation of “3” falls. Thus, his wellbeing, as 
measured by equation (4), rises. The levels of relative deprivation of “1” and “2” 
increase, so their wellbeing takes a beating. It is tempting then to skim off income from 
“3,” who gains as a consequence of the merger, and disburse that income to those who 
experience a loss as a consequence of the merger, such that following the merger no 
individual will be worse off in terms of wellbeing as defined in equation (4). The 
maximal income that can be taken away from “3” is a little less than 1. The reason is that 
if a full income unit were to be taken away, “3” will experience relative deprivation of 
1/2 - just as prior to the merger - and his income will be lower than prior to the merger. 
With the same relative deprivation and a lower income, the wellbeing of “3” is reduced. 
But imagine for a minute that one income unit (rather than a little less than that) is indeed 
taken away; to yield the maximal gain to (1,2) that a unit of income could confer, the unit 
income has to be given to “1” such that the (hypothetical) income distribution will 
become (2,2,2,4). In this case, the relative deprivation of “1” will be restored to 1/2. 
However, “2” (the second individual in this last income vector) is exposed to more 
relative deprivation than prior to the merger ( (2,(2,2,2,4)) 1/ 2 (2,(1,2)) 0RD RD=> = ), 
and there is no income around that can be taken away to appease this individual. But of 
course, and as already noted, we cannot even take away from “3” a full unit of income; 
we can at most take a little less than one unit, and therefore, a “tax and transfer” scheme 
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cannot achieve its aim because there is not enough of a gain to compensate the losers 
while still keeping the gainer as well off as prior to the merger.  
 
7. Generalizations and conclusion 
In related writings (Stark, 2010; Stark et al., 2011) and in work in progress (Stark and 
Jakubek, 2011) it is shown that all four results hold or apply when each of the merged 
populations is of any size, when the populations overlap, when incomes are not (pair-
wise) distinct, and when there are several gainers rather than just one. The only case in 
which a merger does not exacerbate aggregate deprivation is when the income 
distribution of the two populations is identical.  
An increase in aggregate relative deprivation is a downside of the integration of 
regions. It puts a strain on the individuals in the merged population, casting a shadow on 
the production and trade (scale and scope) benefits anticipated from the integration. As 
already mentioned, the integration of regions is expected to increase efficiency. When the 
possibility of a merger is contemplated, an interesting question to address would then be 
whether the anticipated boost in productivity will suffice to pay for the cost of the 
policies discussed above.  
The result that the ARD of two merged regions is higher than the sum of the ARDs 
of the constituent regions when apart carries through to the case of the merger of three (or 
more) regions. This follows straightforwardly from the following consideration. Suppose 
that there are three regions with populations 
1P , 2P , and 3P  whose income vectors are 
(1,2), (3,4), and (5,6), respectively. In section 3, I already showed that 
( ) ( ) ( )1,2,3,4 1,2 3,4 .ARD ARD ARD> +  By the same reasoning, ( )1,2,3,4,5,6ARD  
( ) ( )1,2,3,4 5,6 .ARD ARD> +  And by transitivity, it follows that ( )1,2,3,4,5,6ARD  
( ) ( ) ( )1,2 3,4 5,6 .ARD ARD ARD> + +  (This type of reasoning can be replicated for the 
case of the merger of any number of regions.) A different way of expressing this result is 
that an increase in the number of merged regions cannot reverse the ARD repercussion of 
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